In 1982 state governments were given the opportunity to assume responsibility for the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Small Cities Community Development Block Grant program (CDBG) . As authorized by the 1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, state officials, not federal personnel, were permitted to devise their own procedures for awarding federal dollars to community development projects in their respective states. This intergovernmental transfer of program control was part of President Reagan's plan to create a new set of federal-state relationships.
• Of the nine block grants created or revised by the 1981 Budget Act, 2 only the Small Cities CDBG program had been a solely national-to-local grant. That is, for CDBG's frrst seven years (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) , state governments were bypassed in the award process. State governments already bad considerable experience and influence, however, with the other eight block grants. Because of this radical departure from past practice, the Small Cities program has been labeled as "the truest test of state administrative innovation and changing governmental relations under the block grant component of the Reagan 'New Federalism'. "3 Reagan's vision of intergovernmental relations presumed that "devolution of responsibilities to governments closer to the people" would yield policy choices that differed from those made by national government agencies in charge of grants-in-aid. 4 The debate over the devolution of the Small Cities program revolved around several questions about state governments and their role in program implementation and the impact of a devolved program on eligible jurisdictions. For example, did the states possess sufficient managerial capacity to operate the Small Cities program effectively? Would state administration be responsive to local priorities, and would program procedures be suited to the capabilities of small cities? Would devolution maintain national policy objectives and standards, especially the federal government's commitment to the low-and moderate-income ( MIT Press, 1975) .
1 Three administrative procedures attempted between 1968 and 1972 with the aim of reforming the Model Cities and other community development programs were (I) Neighborhood Development Programs (NDPs), (2) Annual Arrangement (AA) provisions, and (3) Pla.aned Variations (PYs). The three reforms shared the common goals of a reduction of federal intru· sion into local projectS and an expansion of local officials' discretion in project design. However. these administrative proc:edures failed to eliminate the increasing number of complaints by local government officiak that cx=ive ca1eg0rization and proliferation of federal community development programs produced both confusion among the varying requirements of the different grantsin-aid and unnecessary national intrusion into local affairs. Their importance derives from their role as precursors to CDBG and their failure to create a sufficient " no-strings" environment for HUD programs. See Williams, Governii'U!Tit by Agency, pp. 39-40, for a more detailed discussion of these reforms. ty development program. 8 The Nixon-Ford decentralist strategy assumed that this amalgamation of separate community development categorical grants into a "block" of money would give local authorities a greater degree of discretion and selection among eligible activities and projects than did the previous hodgepodge of categorical grants. This assumption was conflnlled as CDBG grew to be the largest and most popular of the original New Federalism block grants.9
Congress mandated seven national objectives for the new block grant. The "most important (and controversial)" objective was the requirement that CDBG monies be spent to assist primarily "persons of low and moderate income. "
10 HUD operationalized these multiple goals into a "needs" formula that was used to compute the annual entitlements made to cities of at least 50,000 population and to urban counties. 11 Small cities and rural areas bad not been the main targets of federal community development policy during its twenty-five year evolution prior to HCDA's passage. 12 Nor were smaller jurisdictions the intended targets of the 1974 CDBG program. They were included in HCDA by the congressional subcommittees on housing in order to bolster support for the block grant program. 13 Congress set aside approximately 20 percent of the available CDBG funds fci'r a "discretionary" pool of money (see PL 95-128, Sec. 106) to provide grants awarded by HUDon a competitive basis to the nation's smaller governments (i.e., with populations under 50,000). More than 33,000 small general-purpose governments eligible for CDBG funding thus were required to vie with one another for the "discretionary" awards. 14 By forcing smaller jurisdictions into a nationwide competition for CDBG money, Congress denied smaller cities and rural areas the annual entitlements made available to larger communities and also placed the smaller cities in 8 The seven categorical grants folded into the 1974 CDBG program were (1) Urban Renewal. the position of adapting local community development goals to the award criteria established by HUD. Although only 959 nonmetropolitan jurisdictions applied for the discretionary money in the first year, Jj the number of applications rapidly increased in subsequent years. HUD developed a Project Selection System {PSS) to sort out the increasing number of applications. 16 Success for a given small city did not come easy, as evidenced by the 37 .2 percent success rate (357 awards out of 959 applications) in FY 1975. 17 HUD used its authority over the discretionary funds for small cities to push localities in the direction of housing rehabilitation. 18 Small cities that applied for CDBG dollars quickly discovered that they would be successful only if they listed housing rehabilitation as their top priority . 1 9
HUD's treatment of small cities and rural areas led to a series of well founded complaints. For example, two separate studies of HUD's administration of the Small Cities CDBG program confirmed the allegation that awards within the nonmetropolitan category usually went to the relatively larger jurisdictions, while the smallest cities (e.g., under 5,000 population), where "need" often was most acute, lost out in the national competition for project funds. 20 Not only did these fmdings demonstrate that the smallest jurisdictions were at a disadvantage in the "grant game," but the results also confirmed the contention that HUD concentrated Small Cities projects in the relatively larger small cities that were more likely to possess the management capacity to operate the comprehensive slum removal projects pre- 1~e Project Selection System combined three components: (1) the degree to which the pro· posed project directly met the criteria established by HCDA, (2) the degree to which LMl per· sons were to be benefited, and (3) 24 The Reagan administration immediately touted the demonstration project as evidence that states could take over many federal assistance programs. 25 The transfer of the Small Cities program to state management fit neatly into Reagan's New Federalism initiatives and was included in the 1981 Budget Act. State administration of the Small Cities program drew sharp but futile opposition from interest groups that sought to continue the direct linkage between Washington, D.C. and the local jurisdictions. The National League of Cities (NLC) worried about the states' management capacity and about a possible rebirth of traditional state-municipality rivalry over local development programs. Citizens groups, such as Rural America, believed that the transfer proposal would diminish the social targeting of CDBG funds to LMI beneficiaries. u
The 1981 act raised the percentage of CDBG funds set aside for eligible nonmetropolitan cities and counties from 20 percent to 30 percent. Compared to the $926 million for FY 1981, $1.019 billion (one of the few nondefense increases in the 1981 act) was appropriated for Small Cities CDBG in FY 1982. 27 The act also specified that states electing to administer the program must "buy-in" by making a 10 percent cash or in-kind match and must prepare statements of community development objectives and fund uses. 28 Thirty-six states and Puerto Rico "bought-in" to state administration in FY 1982, and in FY 1983 (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) history of Small Cities CDBG awards in Mississippi serves as a strong test of programmatic changes due to devolution because this state (1) contains the largest proportion of targeted LMI citizens in the nation, (2) has the country's third largest proportion of targeted communities (i.e., under 50,000 population), and (3) only recently has adopted some administrative reforms (e.g. , a merit system, executive preparation of budgets, and program evaluations) common in other states. Mississippi's experience with state control of the Small Cities CDBG program will be examined through a description of the state's award process and by a comparison of award patterns under state administration (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) with those made by HUD (1975 HUD ( -1981 .
A systematic test of the changes resulting from the transfer of the Small Cities program to state control would require a comparison of the pattern of awards made by state agencies with the panern under earlier HUD administration. The data for the before and after analysis presented here comes from the eleven year history (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) Although Mississippi has changed from a strictly agricultural economy to one that includes significant manufacturing and service sectors, the state remains very rural with a widely dispersed population. Compared to the national average of 73.7 percent urban population, Mississippi's urban population is 47.3 percent (only Vermont and West Virginia are more rural). Eightythree percent of all county seats, usually the largest municipality in a county, have a population of less than 5,000. Only three Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas exist wholly within the state and only one city, the state capital of Jackson, has a population over 50,000. 32 The competitive award systems exhibit the design freedom and the individual imagination and policy objectives of the various states. Five basic types of competitive mechanisms bave emerged among the states: (1) general competition, (2) competition by project type. (3) single/multipurpose grant competition, (4) population-based competition, and (S) hybrid competition. Project competition is most typical (used by 47.4 percent of the swes), with general competition being second in popularity (26.2 percent). Hybrid competition (13.3 percent), single/multipurpose competition (7 .8 percent), and population-based competition (5.3 pen:ent) are used by the remaining states. For more detail, see ibid.
Mississippi decided to let the applications drive the award system ... funds were not set aside [initially) for each of the program areas (i.e., economic development, housing, and public works) targeted by the Governor's CDBG Taslc Force prior to receipt of apptications .. . the needs expressed in each of the three target areas determined the amount of state funds set aside for each area. 33 To select grant rectpients from applicants, the Governor's Office staff developed a rating system that assigned points (maximum of 1 ,000) to each application. Half of the points were gained from the general rating factors for all projects (i.e., management capacity factors) and half of the points were based on the project's quality. Each jurisdiction's application was rated by several staff members of the Depanment of Community Development, and the data submitted as part of the application were verified through onsite visits by staff from the depanmeru . .JA The director of the Governor's Office best summarized the Mississippi award mechanism when she said: "Federal decisions were typically a go/ no go decision. Ours is a more complex scoring system, so that no one factor will win or lose an award ."'J, One of tbe complaints local officials (in Mississippi and elsewhere) had about HUD administration was the constant change in HUD rules. This same concern was raised about state administration during public hearings in Mississippi. Although the Governor's Office claimed a commitment to retaining tbe basic application and competition procedures for several years. important changes occurred in the first four years, partly as a result of a change in governors. For example, the FY 1982 threshold for LMI, which was the old HUD figure of 80 percent, was altered to 51 percent. This change was executed "with guidance from HUD." 36 Second, Mississippi's award criteria for FY 1984 were changed from a general competition to a competitive award system based on four types of projects and three different decision cycles: (1) housing and public works awarded on an annual basis, (2) economic development awarded on a monthly basis, and (3) "special opportunities" awarded on an "urgent need" (i.e., emergency) basis. 37 
The Pattern of CDBG A wards in Mississippi
The decision process used by Mississippi during its frrst four years (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) pattern substantially different from the earlier practices under HUD administration (1975 HUD administration ( -1981 . Table 1 shows that HUD awarded an annual average of 41 Small Cities grants to Mississippi, a state with 289 eligible small cities and 78 eligible counties. The CDBG awards funded by HUD averaged almost a half million dollars per award and went primarily to comprehensive housing rehabilitation projects (HUD's operational defmition of community development).
This preference for fairly large-scale grants to a relatively small number of jurisdictions was the typical award pattern nationwide during HUD's seven years of responsibility for the Small Cities program. Serious management problems sometimes were the result. Small cities with part-time elected officials and few if any trained public managers struggled to handle the large (for them) projects and budgets (sometimes exceeding annual city operating budgets by three or four times). Consequently, HUD area office personnel tended to avoid allocating grants to smaller communities (usually under 5,000 population) that could not easily manage typical renewal projects or afford full-time grantsmen. 38 One of the strongest criticisms voiced by local officials under HUD's operation of the Small Cities program concerned the relative inability of smaller cities to obtain CDBG awards. 00 Table 2 shows that, although "larger" small cities (i.e., more than 5,000 residents) constituted only 17 percent of all Mississippi municipalities, HUD placed almost half (45 percent) of its FY 1981 Small Cities grants in these localities. Mississippi officials after 1981 reversed this concentration of awards by increasing the proportion of grants to cities under 2,500 population. While HUD in FY 1981 awarded only 13 of 40 (32.5 percent) grants to cities under 2,500, state administrators increased this number to 37 of 58 grants (63.8 percent) by FY 1985. A corresponding change in the distribution of CDBG awards made to Mississippi counties was also achieved by state officials. 4 ' Clearly. smaller Mississippi cities became more successful under state administration in applying for and receiving CDBG grants. Proportionately fewer such governments were denied funding after 1981, 42 a pattern that corresponded to national trends. 43 Larger small cities were not necessarily losers in this trend. As Table 2 notes, the number of CDBG grants given to cities with populations of more than 5,000 remained about the same after the last year of HUD administration. Rather, the increase in awards to the smallest plac. es was accomplished by reducing the sizes of individual grants and spreading out community development funds to more jurisdictions in total. The proposal to devolve authority over Small Cities funds to state officials had provoked fears that national community development objectives would be compromised or even ignored. Although the 1974 HCDA permitted thirteen different categories of eligible projects, HUD, during its period of control, converted the Small Cities Block Grants into a new version of the department's previous urban renewal program with an emphasis on housing rehabilitation. Evidence from different studies demonstrates that many states increased the number of awards made for public works and economic development projects and, at the same time, decreased the number of awards made in support of housing rehabilitation ... Mississippi was no exception. Just over 60 percent of the CDBG awards made by Mississippi officials in 1982-1985 were for public works; only 4.9 percent supported housing projects. Economic development projects accounted for 15 percent of the state's awards and almost 13 percent of the awards supponed emergency (urgent needs) relief projects.
•s Opponents of state administration of the Small Oties program argued that state government would award CDBG funds in a manner divergent from national policy objectives. To what extent did the state benefit low-and moderate-income persons in its CDBG allocations during 1982-1985? Table 3 shows that high percentages of funds in each of the four years went to such populations, based on the characteristics of recipient neighborhoods. The four-year average was 83.3 percent, which exceeded HUD's "75-25" rule and was an exception to Paul Dommel's fmding ·that HUD's "level of social targeting . . . reached a plateau with most jurisdictions tending to cluster around an average of 60 to 65 percent. " 46 The Mississippi experience also compares favorably with the results from the 1983 GAO study of the Small Cities program that contrasted the last year of HUD administration (1981) with the first year of state operation (1982) Another approach by which to determine the extent of state divergence from national policy objectives is to measure the degree of change in the types of jurisdictions that received awards from HUD compared to the types of jurisdictions that received awards from the state. Table 4 explores the "needs" related characteristics of Mississippi cities that were awarded CDBG funds between [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] . Two significant changes are evident. First, the average population size of grant recipients decreased after state takeover by 26.4 percent , a direct consequence of the Mississippi decision to expand the number of awards given. Second, the average percentage of black population in recipient cities dropped after 1981. Because the state decided to distribute CDBG grants to a larger number of cities under state administration (an annual average of 99 as compared to only 41 under HUD administration), it was no longer possible to concentrate Small Cities funds in municipalities (77 out of 289) with majority black populations. • More grants were awarded annually under state administration, and the average dollar amount of each grant was smaller.
• Three-fourths of the projects funded were for public works or economic development, while housing and concentrated neighborhood revitalization projects accounted for less than 10 percent of the state's awards.
• More than three-fifths of the state's awards went to the smallest cities. with popuJations of 2,500 and under.
• The probabilitY that a given small city would obtain a CDBG grant almost doubled.
• The percentage of funds benefiting low-and moderate-income persons remained essentially the same.
These new features and outcomes resulting from state takeover meant that in Mississippi the Small Cities program experienced change in a complex fashion. On the one hand. state administration expanded the program to include more diversity in the types of projects eligible and fundable under the state's award criteria. At the same time, state administration narrowed the CDBG program at the community level by channeling the bulk of community development funds to single-purpose projects rather than to multipurpose/ neighborhood reconstruction projects. It is relevant to note that the programmatic changes due to devolution observed in Mississippi fit closely with the changes that have been reported in other States.
• 9 Clearly, small cities and counties in Mississippi gained increased access to CDBG money with the move to state administration. Mississippi's award criteria ensured that more of the smallest localities would obtain Community Development grants. Although the price paid for this greater " success " rate has been smaller (in dollar terms) annual awards, many of the smallest localities in Mississippi that did not receive funds from HUD received assistance from the state. With more very small cities being awarded CDBG funds, the previous advantage larger communities had over smaller ones was reduced. One imponant consequence of this inclusion of smaller cities in the ranks of COBG recipients was that a major obstacle to small town development-the absence of capital-could be more easily overcome for some communities.so
Another set of policy consequences generated by state control can be thought of as a " return to the past." The state-managed CDBG program restored the linkage between state and local governments that the HUD-local relationship had weakened. While small cities in the past had charged that state governments ignored them, the shift from HUO to state administration not only funded more cities, but also offered them more choices and thus was more responsive to local needs. Because the Mississippi award system provided options as to types of projects eligible for funding, jurisdictions in this state were able to tailor their own strategies for community development. State administration permitted the small cities to pursue traditional municipal priorities, such as public works projects, an option limited by the earlier HUO emphasis on housing construction and rehabilitation.s 1 CDBG support for housing projects was still available under state administration, an indication of how small town officials in Mississippi were given freedom of choice in the design and execution of local community development after
1981.
Perhaps the broadest and most fundamental outcome of state administration as exemplified by the Mississippi case involves the definition of "community development." Through four decades of national policy debates, there
has not yet emerged a consensus on the meaning of community development, especially in terms of the citizens to be served and the strategies to be utilized. Are the beneficiaries to be the inner city poor, the rural poor, families with moderate as well as low incomes, or all such groups? Even more disagreement exists over the appropriate and effective strategies by which "community development" can be advanced. Should funds be expended on slum clearance, on income subsidies, on job creation, or on the improvement of essential communitywide services? Much of the conflict over the CDBG program arises out of the confusion over these policy choices. 52 Debate also continues, of course, over which level of government should make these policy choices.
Devolution of the Small Cities program diminished the voice of HUD poiicymakers and enhanced the voice of state and local government officials in the defmition and strategies of community development. HUD was no longer able to dictate to localities project priorities for COBG funds. Instead, project types and communities benefited became a function of intrastate political and administrative considerations as well as national policy. In the case of Mississippi, state government officials devised an award system that accommodated the requests of small-city officials and allocated CDBG money to a wider range of communities than under HUD administration. While state and local interests were being served, national policy in targeting CDBG funds to low-and moderate-income persons continued to be applied in Mississippi.
